The Constitutionality of the New Federal Estate Tax Definition of a Transfer Taking Effect at Death by Lowndes, Charles L.B.
Vanderbilt Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 2 Issue 2 - February 1950 Article 2 
2-1-1950 
The Constitutionality of the New Federal Estate Tax Definition of a 
Transfer Taking Effect at Death 
Charles L.B. Lowndes 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr 
Recommended Citation 
Charles L.B. Lowndes, The Constitutionality of the New Federal Estate Tax Definition of a Transfer Taking 
Effect at Death, 3 Vanderbilt Law Review 203 (1950) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol3/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, 
please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu. 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE NEW FEDERAL ESTATE
TAX DEFINITION OF A TRANSFER TAKING EFFECT
AT DEATH
CHARLES L. B. LOWNDES*
The manifest reluctance in recent years on the part of the Supreme Court
to declare any provisi6n of the Federal Estate Tax unconstitutional 1 may have
given rise to the assumption that there are no constitutional limitations on the
transfers which Congress can tax under the estate tax. One of the 1949 amend-
ments to the tax should test the validity of this assumption. In an effort to bring
some order out of the chaos stemming mediately from Helvering v. Hallock,2
and immediately from Spiegel's Estate v. Commissioner,3 Congress provided
recently that a transfer after October 7, 1949, shall be deemed to be a transfer
taking effect at death, even though the transferor retains no interest in the
property transferred, provided that "possession or enjoyment of the property
can be obtained only by surviving the decedent." 4
Apart from any constitutional problem, the new amendment is an interest-
ing illustration of the tail wagging the dog. After the Supreme Court held in
Helvering v. Hallock 5 that a transfer with a "possibility of reverter" was
taxable as a transfer taking effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death,
considerable confusion developed as to the precise scope of that decision. In an
attempt to define the limits of the Hallock case, the Treasury ruled that it only
applied where in addition to the transferor reserving an interest in the property
transferred "possession or enjoyment of the transferred interest can be
obtained only by beneficiaries who survive the decedent." 6 The recent amend-
ment makes the limitation on the rule the principal basis for the application of
the rule by providing that survivorship alone, without any retained interest,
shall be sufficient to make a transfer after October 7, 1949, taxable. In this
respect, it is unusual, but not unique. A parallel situation arose in connection
with the 1942 Amendments dealing with the taxation of life insurance, where
* Acting Dean, Duke University School of Law; author of numerous articles in
legal periodicals, especially in the field of Federal Taxation.
1. Compare Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772 (1932),
and Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531, 47 Sup. Ct. 710, 71 L. Ed. 1184 (1927), withHelvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 56 Sup. Ct. 70, 80 L. Ed. 62(1935), Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297, 58 Sup. Ct. 565, 82 L. Ed. 840 (1938),
and United States v. Jacobs, 306 U. S. 363, 59 Sup. Ct. 551, 83 L. Ed. 763 (1939).2. 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940).3. 335 U. S. 701, 69 Sup. Ct. 301 (1949). See also Commissioner v. Church's
Estate, 335 U. S. 632, 69 Sup. Ct. 322 (1949).
4. IxT. REV. CODE § 811 (c) (3), as amended by Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. § 7 (Oct. 25, 1949).
5. 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940).6. U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.17, as amended by T. D. 5512, 1946-1 Cum. BULL. 264(May 1, 1946), and T. D. 5741 (Sept. 6, 1949).
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the incidents of ownership and payment of premium tests, which had been
developed in order to limit the tax on insurance payable to beneficiaries other
than the estate of the insured, were transmuted into the principal bases of the
tax.
7
The immediate question is not, however, how the recent statutory defini-
tion of transfers taking effect at death evolved, but whether it is constitutional,
since it represents a significant departure from the past philosophy of the estate
tax. The estate tax is designed primarily to tax the transmission of property at
death. Since a death tax which was limited to taxing testamentary and intestate
transfers would invite avoidance by means of transfers which were living in
form but testamentary in substance, Congress has surrounded the tax on testate
and intestate succession with a protective periphery of taxes on inter vivos
transfers which might be resorted to in lieu of a will. With certain significant
exceptions, however, all of the inter vivos transfers taxed under the statute
have the common characteristic that they involve the transfer of some sort of
interest from the decendent at his death. Thus, for example, in the case of joint
estates,5 although the property passes to the surviving tenant under a legal
fiction of survivorship which treats title to the property as having been in the
survivor since the beginning of the tenancy, there is actually a transfer of sub-
stantial benefits at the decedent's death. The same thing is true of a transfer
with a reservation of a life estate.9 Although the remainder in legal contempla-
tion vests completely during the decedent's life, there is a transfer of possession
and enjoyment at his death. This is also true of a revocable or alterable trust.10
Although title to the trust property vests during the decedent's life, there
is a further transfer at his death when the powers which he has retained lapse.
In all of these cases the substance of the tax is a tax upon the transfer of some
interest passing from the decedent at his death, irrespective of form. In the
case of a gift in contemplation of death," a tax may be imposed although the
transferor divests himself of all interest in the property transferred during his
7. INT. REv. CODE § 811(g) (2). Since 1942 the statute has explicitly provided that
insurance payable to beneficiaries other than the estate of the insured shall be taxable
only if (A) the insured paid the premiums or (B) had incidents of ownership.
8. INT. REv. CODE § 811(e).
9. INT. REV. CODE § 811(c) (1) (B). Section 7 of Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong.,
1st Sess. (Oct. 25, 1949), in addition to adding a new definition for transfers taking
effect at death when such transfers occur after October 7, 1949, provides that transfers
before October 8, 1949, shall not be taxable as transfers taking effect at death, unless
the transferor reserved some reversionary interest which at the time of his death
exceeds 5% of the value of the property transferred. It is interesting to note that in
the case of transfers prior to October 8, 1949, there is no mention in the statute of any
requirement of survivorship. Another interesting aspect of Pub. L. No. 378 is that
sections 7 and 8 in effect overrule the recent Supreme Court decision of Commissioner
v. Church's Estate, 335 U. S. 632, 69 Sup. Ct. 322 (1949), by providing that transfers
with a reservation of a life estate, which were not taxable before that decision, shall
not be taxed where the transferor dies prior to 1950 and that any such reserved life
estate may be released without incurring any gift tax liability until 1951.
10. INT. REv. CODE § 811(d).
11. INT. REv. CODE § 811(c) (1) (A).
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life. However, the lack of a testamentary transfer is supplied by the intention
of the transferor to make a living transfer which will operate in lieu of testa-
mentary transmission.' 2 Even Helvering v. Hallock 13 was predicated upon a
transfer with a reservation of a "possibility of reverter" and involved a tax
upon a transfer from the decedent at death. As long as the tax on insurance pay-
able to beneficiaries other than the insured was qualified by the incidents-of-
ownership doctrine, the tax was limited to the testamentary transfer involved in
the, lapse of such incidents at the death of the insured. The present statute taxing
life insurance, 14 which rejects the incidents-of-ownership limitation, involves
a departure from the fundamental philosophy of the statute by taxing a trans-
fer where nothing passes from the decedent at his death. The premium test,
which imposes a tax even where the insured surrenders all interest in an in-
surance policy during his life, appears to base the tax upon enjoyment accruing
to the beneficiary at the death of the insured, rather than the transfer of any
interest from the insured at that time. The new provision for taxing transfers
taking effect at death is not, therefore, the first break with the past philosophy
of the tax. However, the Supreme Court has yet to pass upon the constitutional-
ity of the present system of taxing life insurance. Moreover, even if the present
system of taxing insurance is constitutional, there may be significant differences
between the taxation of insurance and the recent definition of gifts taking
effect at death.
The distinguishing characteristic of the new definition of transfers taking
effect at death is that a tax is imposed even though nothing passes at death,
provided that the enjoyment of the transferee is conditioned upon surviving
the transferor. The only connection between the tax and the transferor's death
is that his death is the temporal point which marks the beginning of the en-
joyment of the transferee. Is this a sufficient connection to justify the imposi-
tion of an estate tax?
In passing upon the constitutionality of the provisions of the Federal
Estate Tax concerning inter vivos transfers, the Supreme Court has developed
several tests. Under the earlier cases it was held that the estate tax was limited
constitutionally to testamentary transfers.15 The concept of a testamentary
transfer apparently envisions the passage of some interest from the decedent
at his death. Thus, for example, in Reinecke v. Northern Trust Company,16
the Supreme Court held that a transfer where a decedent had parted with
all of his interest in the transferred property during his life was not taxable
as a transfer taking effect at death merely because the enjoyment of the prop-
erty shifted from one transferee to another at his death. It is true that in this
12. Milliken v. United States, 283 U. S. 15, 51 Sup. Ct. 324, 75 L. Ed. 809 (1931).
13. 309 U. S. 106, 60 Sup. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604 (1940).
14. INT. REV. CODE § 811(g) (2).
15. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772 (1932).
16. 278 U. S. 339, 49 Sup. Ct. 123, 73 L. Ed. 410 (1929).
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case the Court was not dealing directly with constitutionality, but with construc-
tion. However, the Court pointed out that its conclusion upon the construction
of the statute was dictated by the desire to avoid the grave constitutional doubts
which would be raised by a contrary construction.17 It seems apparent that these
constitutional doubts were generated by the feeling that there was no testa-
mentary transfer when nothing passed from the transferor at his death.
Although it seems clear that the present statute could not pass the testa-
mentary transfer test, this may not be material in view of the apparent re-
jection of this test in recent years in favor of a more liberal "penumbra"
theory.' 8 Under the penumbra test an estate tax may be imposed upon an inter
vivos transfer, if this is a reasonable method of preventing avoidance of the
tax. The constitutionality of the recent amendment to the estate tax, there-
fore, seems to resolve itself into the question of whether or not the tax is a
reasonable method of preventing avoidance of the estate tax. It is difficult
to see that it is. Under the new definition of a transfer taking effect at death,
if A conveys property to T in trust to accumulate the income during A's life
and at A's death to distribute the property to B, the trust would be taxable.
Or if A conveyed the property to T in trust to accumulate the income for 30
years or until A's death and upon the happening of the earlier event to distrib-
ute the property to B, the trust property would be taxable to A's estate pro-
vided he died before the 30 years expired. 19 What type of tax avoidance is
facilitated by these transfers over and above that which may be achieved by
any ordinary inter vivos gift? If A gives property to T in trust for B and pro-
vides that the income is to be accumulated for a term of years so far in excess
of A's normal life expectancy that the property probably will not vest in enjoy-
ment until after A's death, this is not a taxable transfer.20 Postponement of
enjoyment until after the transferor's death does not make a transfer taxable
as long as the enjoyment is not conditioned upon his death. It would seem
17. "Doubts of the constitutionality of the statute, if construed as contended by the
government, would require us to adopt the construction, at least reasonably possible
here, which would uphold the act." 278 U. S. at 348.
18. Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U. S. 85, 56 Sup. Ct. 70, 80
L. Ed. 62 (1935); Helvering v. Bullard, 303 U. S. 297, 58 Sup. Ct. 565, 82
L. Ed. 840 (1938). The test is frequently referred to as the "penumbra" test in defer-
ence to a figure from the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Schlesinger v.
Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 241, 46 Sup. Ct. 260, 70 L. Ed. 557 (1926), where, in arguing
for the constitutionality of a conclusive presumption that gifts made within six years
of a decedent's death were in contemplation of death, Holmes said: "But the law
allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order
that the object may be secured." 270 U. S. at 241.
19. The amendment provides that a transfer after October 7, 1949, shall be deemed
to be a transfer taking effect at death, where the possession or enjoyment of the trans-
feree is conditioned upon surviving the transferor, or alternatively upon surviving the
earlier to occur of the transferor's death or some other event, provided that the other event
did not in fact occur during the transferor's life. The statute also provides that such trails-
fers shall not be taxable if possession or enjoyment of the property can be obtained
during the grantor's life by any beneficiary through the exercise of a taxable power of
appointment. Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (Oct. 25, 1949).
20. Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545, 47 Sup. Ct. 461, 71 L. Ed. 764 (1927).
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apparent that the only way in which a man can avoid an estate tax by an inter
vivos gift, apart from a transfer in contemplation of death, 21 is to make a gift
under which he keeps some strings on the property given away until his death.
If he entirely divests himself of all interest in property during his life, it is
difficult to see how such a transfer can be used successfully to avoid the
estate tax. The recent amendment to the estate tax which is divorced entirely
from the past philosophy of a transfer at the decedent's death certainly cannot
be justified as a tax upon a testamentary transfer. It is scarcely easier to sus-
tain as a reasonable prophylactic against tax avoidance.
The only provision of the estate tax bearing any close analogy to the
recent amendment taxing transfers taking effect at death are the insurance pro-
visions.22 Under the insurance provisions if a man pays the premiums on an
insurance policy on his life payable to one other than his estate, the insurance
will be taxed to his estate at his death, even though he completely divests him-
self of all incidents of ownership during his life. This involves taxing a trans-
fer where nothing passes from the decedent at his death. Conceding for the
moment that this provision is constitutional, which is certainly arguable, is the
insurance situation distinguishable from the recent amendment taxing trans-
fers taking effect at death? There are at least two possible distinctions.
Life insurance is inherently testamentary. If a man insures his life in
favor of another and divests himself of all incidents of ownership in the
insurance, his death is still necessary to complete the transfer. The death of
the insured does more than merely mark the point at which the beneficiary's
enjoyment of the insurance proceeds commences. New and greater rights are
generated by the death of the insured. The contingent liability of the insurer
becomes fixed and unconditional. The inchoate right of the beneficiary becomes
consummate. Speaking on a purely pedestrian plane, an insurance policy is
worth much more when the insured is dead than it is when he is living. The
distinction between life insurance and a transfer of property with a provision
for accumulating income until the transferor's death may be fine, but it is
real and substantial.
There are, moreover, practical considerations which serve to distinguish
life insurance from a transfer with a provision for accumulation until the
decedent's death. Unless life insurance is taxed a real gap is left in the statute.
As long as the incidents-of-ownership doctrine prevailed, it was possible for
21. It might be argued that a transfer with a provision for accumulating income
until the transferor's death is a transfer in contemplation of death. However, if the
transfer were actuated by a "life motive" such a desire to escape income taxes, or to
shift the responsibility for managing a burdensome piece of property, it could probably
escape taxation on this ground. At any rate the assumption behind the new statutory
definition of a transfer taking effect at death seems to be that a transfer conditioned
upon surviving the transferor is not necessarily taxable as a transfer in contemplation
of death.
22. INT. REv. CODE § 811(g) (2) ; see note 7 supra.
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a man to build up an unlimited tax-free estate by investing in life insurance
and divesting himself of all incidents of ownership in the insurance. It is diffi-
cult to see that any similar opportunity for tax avoidance has been opened up by
the past omission to tax inter vivos trusts with a provision for accumulating
the income until the settlor's death. The new statutory definition of transfers
taking effect at death may not be unconstitutional. However, it certainly goes
to. the very verge of the constitutional limits marked out by the precedents
defining the permissible area for the taxation of inter vivos transfers under
the Federal Estate Tax.
